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Abstract
This paper assumes that human capital not only generates market incomes but is a direct
source of utility as well. In an otherwise standard framework it is shown that the interaction
between human capital and e⁄ort in raising human capital and in generating utility naturally leads
to history-dependent optimal individual behavior. Depending on the initial distribution of skills,
this history-dependence divides each group of otherwise identical households into two perpetually
separated groups: one rich and educated, the other poor and uneducated. If the rich have a common
interest in the education of the poor (for instance ￿nancing public goods), such polarized equilibria
are typically Pareto-ine¢ cient. While unconditional transfers only reduce the incentives of the
uneducated to accumulate skills, it is shown that there exist activating tax-transfer systems that
Pareto-dominate any non-redistributing tax-system and involve a negative marginal income tax on
household income below a certain threshold.
"Give a man a ￿sh and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to ￿sh and you feed him for
a lifetime." Chinese proverb.
1 Introduction
Human capital as a direct source of satisfaction Most people value their education, their
personal abilities, their knowledge and skills, and their physical and intellectual ￿tness beyond their
role in generating incomes, in particular when these assets have been actively acquired with past
e⁄ort. While standard models of human capital recognize the crucial role of human capital as an asset
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1yielding a return through higher market earning capacity, they generally abstract from its role as a
direct source of utility.
Despite the promotion by such illustrious advocates as Gary Becker and Amartya Sen (see below),
the non-market or the direct e⁄ect on utility of human capital remains largely neglected in the economic
literature. This is certainly not because economic researchers don￿ t value their knowledge and skill for
their own sake or are unaware of the higher wages their human capital may earn outside academics.
The reason is more likely the general perception that the non-economic returns of education are not
an economic issue and are better taken care o⁄ by other social sciences. As Becker (Becker [1993])
already noted, such a perception is obviously ill justi￿ed since ignoring human capital as a direct source
of satisfaction or more generally, as a source of non-economic returns, quantitatively underestimates
the total return to the investment into human capital and therefore underestimates the motivation to
invest.
The crucial assumption of the present paper is that human capital (education, skill, ￿tness or know-
ledge) is a direct source of pleasure and satisfaction. It explicitly includes the state variable ￿human
capital￿as an argument in the instantaneous utility function of the individual household intertemporal
optimization problem. At the same time it retains the standard assumptions of this problem: Human
capital generates income, e⁄ort raises the stock of human capital and reduces (instantaneous) utility.
Path-dependent individual behavior Ignoring the direct utility of human capital not only un-
derestimates the total return to the investment into human capital. More importantly it also alters
the qualitative nature of the interaction between human capital, the investment into human capital
(e⁄ort), and the economic return to human capital (income): This paper shows that the interaction
between skill and e⁄ort in raising the future stock of human capital and in generating utility naturally
leads to history-dependent optimal individual behavior.
The possibility of history dependent behavior requires that the incentive to exert e⁄ort rises with
rising skill. This requirement involves both the accumulation and the utility of human capital. Con-
cerning the former it will be assumed that the e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort (in raising skill) is increasing in
the skill level so far attained: E⁄ort is the more e⁄ective, the more one already knows (Equivalently,
one could assume that e⁄ort is the more pleasant the more one knows). As for the latter, the rising
e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort in generating skill should not be neutralized by too strongly decreasing marginal
utility of skill. This second part of the requirement will follow from what I will call the ￿Maslow
condition￿ . The condition is reminiscent of Maslow￿ s ￿Hierarchy of needs￿ ( Maslow [1943,1954])
which features in many introductory text book on the psychology of motivation. Maslow posited a
hierarchy of human needs based on two groupings: de￿ciency needs and growth needs. In Maslow￿ s
hierarchy, de￿ciency needs must be met before an individual can draw signi￿cant satisfaction from
2growth needs. Adapting this idea to a formal framework with strictly monotone (non-satiable) pref-
erences, the present paper assumes that the marginal (direct) utility does not tend to in￿nity when
human capital tends to zero (Inada condition violated) and that it does not fall with rising human cap-
ital, while the marginal utility of consumption tends to in￿nity when consumption tends to zero (Inada
condition satis￿ed) and falls fast with increasing consumption (the absolute value of the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption is not smaller than one). Thus, the standard Inada condition is
met for small consumption but not for small levels of human capital.
Under this basic assumptions, the history dependence of optimal individual behavior occurs whenever
at low consumption the marginal (instantaneous) utility of consumption is su¢ ciently small compared
to the marginal (instantaneous) disutility of e⁄ort, while the marginal utility of human capital rises
su¢ ciently fast with rising consumption. There then exists a threshold skill level, below which the
e⁄ort necessary to lift a household beyond the threshold is unattractively high. Any household initially
below this level chooses a path towards increasing passivity and sustained poverty. In contrast, house-
holds with initial human capital above the threshold ￿motivated both by economic and non-economic
rewards ￿chose a path toward sustained activity, high skill and income.
Polarization and Pareto-E¢ ciency Path dependent individual behavior generates a source of
polarization: If within a group of otherwise identical households not all are initially positioned at the
same side of the threshold, then this group will eventually become completely polarized into two types
of identical households, one uneducated and poor and one educated and rich.
In the absence of external e⁄ects any intertemporal equilibrium in the threshold economy, even
an extremely polarized one, is Pareto-e¢ cient. Of course, the poor and uneducated would be better
o⁄ being rich and educated, but given their initial human capital below threshold they choose a path
towards even more passivity because it is optimal for them to do so! The path-dependence is not a
result of coordination failures between households but simply of individual optimization.
Pareto-optimal or not, the extreme inequality coming along with the polarization would call for
massive redistribution from rich to poor in most existing industrial countries. In part, the predomin-
ance of redistributing tax-transfer systems may originate in the balance of political power that forces
the rich to ￿nance transfers to the poor. In part, these redistributing systems arise because actually
there do exist external e⁄ects inducing the rich to voluntarily vote for such systems.
Irrespective of which of these reasons explains why existing ￿scal systems redistribute, an important
aspect of redistribution in an economy with endogenous human capital accumulation must be the
question how the tax-transfer scheme a⁄ects the individual incentives to accumulate human capital.
The present paper addresses this question in a framework with external e⁄ects, such that a polarized
market equilibrium will in general not be Pareto-e¢ cient. Positive externalities from the action, the
3human capital or the income of the poor a⁄ect the utility of the rich and educated. While in reality
there may be numbers of such externalities, this paper concentrates on one that is most common in
standard economics: It assumes the existence of a public good.1 The larger the number of ￿nancially
strong households that can participate in ￿nancing the public good, the better for everybody. The
rich and educated bene￿t from the education of the so far uneducated simply because this either
reduces their own contribution or raises the amount of the public good. Whether or not polarization
is Pareto-ine¢ cient now depends on how much it would cost the rich to motivate the poor towards a
path of learning. In the present setting the rich have strictly positive willingness to pay to contribute
to a welfare system if this guarantees the education of the poor beyond the threshold su¢ ciently fast.
If this willingness to pay is high enough to compensate the poor￿ s￿disutility of the e⁄ort necessary to
raise their education, then polarization is Pareto-ine¢ cient.
All essential issues of the present paper could be discussed in a framework without externalities (no
public good, no altruism or paternalism) and a government that wants to maximize a utilitarian social
welfare function. It is clear that such a government would want to redistribute a polarized market
outcome (otherwise the ratio of the poor￿ s to the rich￿ s marginal utility would grow without bound
and redistribution would raise social welfare). In this alternative framework too the rich and educated
bene￿t from the education of the so far uneducated, now because this limits the period during which
they have to support the poor.
Simple transfers As has been explained the only reason to exert e⁄ort for households with low skill
is the economic motive. A simple unconditional transfer, by raising consumption and thus reducing
the marginal utility of consumption, while keeping constant the high disutility of e⁄ort at low skill,
thus only reduces the incentives for such households that have the potential to overcome the cost of
e⁄ort. In fact, it will be shown that such a transfer turns any active low-skill household into an inactive
household. Even if at low consumption the marginal utility of consumption is always su¢ ciently high
to motivate low-skill households to activity and learning (no threshold), a simple (non-contingent)
transfer introduces a threshold.
Suppose that, starting at a Pareto-ine¢ cient polarized equilibrium, a hypothetical social planner or
a real government wants to implement a Pareto-improving tax-transfer system. Such a system has to
1If one agrees with the assertion, that most rich and educated people dislike abolute poverty and the complete lack of
education of their neighboor, one may still disagree on the motives for this aversion. More direct externalities than those
assumed here, also leading to the Pareto-ine¢ ciency of polarization are altruism (the rich￿ s utility is raised by raising
the utility of the poor) or paternalism (the rich￿ s utility is raised by raising income or human capital of the poor, or by
raising e⁄ort and education of the poor).
4win the approval of the poor and at the same time motivate them to raise their e⁄ort such as to increase
their human capital. If simple transfers were the only available policy, this double aim of feeding and
activating would establish an unsolvable dilemma for the government, a version of the "Samaritan￿ s
Dilemma": An unconditional transfer alleviates the material misery of the poor and unskilled but at
the same time reduces their material motivation to exert e⁄ort and thus tends to perpetuate low skill
and low earnings. Even worse, those low skill households that would have emancipated themselves
in the absence of the transfer will now be induced to passivity. Simple transfers can only mitigate
current material misery by perpetuating the passivity of the poor and thus reduce the utility of the
rich ￿nancing the transfer.
Activating Pareto-Improving Welfare and negative marginal income tax Since education
cannot be bought by money,2 unconditioned transfers raise the utility of the unskilled, by generating
su¢ cient consumption in a more comfortable way, without raising their education. They raise the
passivity of the poor and thus do not provide any incentive to the rich to ￿nance the transfer. Starting
from a polarized economy, a welfare system able to bring about a Pareto-improvement has to guarantee
1. Activation: The welfare system has to provide the incentive for the unskilled to exert enough
e⁄ort such as to raise their human capital above the threshold.
2. Voluntary participation by the unskilled: Activation could be forced by a punishment for
not exerting e⁄ort, but this would reduce the utility of the activated household. Thus, activation
has to be sweetened by a transfer, which should be high enough to compensate the bene￿ciaries
for their additional e⁄ort. This necessitates a transfer ￿nanced by the rest of the society.
3. Voluntary participation by the contributor: While the transfer should be high enough to
activate the unskilled, it should be low enough to be worth ￿nancing by the contributor. In
addition the contributors have to be compensated by a su¢ cient increase of the public good (or
reduction of their own tax bill) in the su¢ ciently near future.
Unconditional transfers obviously satisfy (2) but fail to activate and therefore also fail to satisfy
(3). Only a conditional transfer can at the same time satisfy satisfying (1) to (3). To activate, a
transfer has to be conditioned either on su¢ cient e⁄ort or on the fruits of e⁄ort ￿human capital. At
the same time an activating transfer that raises the utility of the poor has to be su¢ ciently large to
compensate for the disutility of the additional e⁄ort. The present paper considers tax-transfer systems
that condition current transfers on current income alone. Can such transfers systems Pareto-improve a
2This also is the reason why the introduction of perfect credit-markets does not eliminate polarization.
5polarized equilibrium? It will be shown that this is generally possible. Furthermore the corresponding
tax-system is shown to involve negative marginal income tax.
Literature
This paper brings together three issues and argues that they are most naturally related: Human capital
in the instantaneous utility function, the possibility of threshold dynamics of individual behavior
caused by the additional interaction between state and control variables, and the activating welfare
the threshold dynamics calls for. None of these issues has received excessive attention in the literature,
but none has been completely neglected.
Human capital in utility Almost 40 years ago, in view of the then still young literature on
human capital Robert Michael [1973] wrote:
"Nearly all this research deals with the e⁄ects of the investment through the labor
market. ... While the increase in market earnings is surely one aspect of the yield of
investments in human capital ￿that is, investments in formal schooling, on-the-job training,
good health, information about markets, etc.￿there is no reason to suppose it is the only
yield on these investments. A distinguishing characteristic of human capital is that it is
embedded in an individual. It therefore accompanies him wherever he goes, not only into
the labor market, but also into the theater, the voting booth, the kitchen, and so forth.
So if human capital yields a ￿ ow of services through the time in the labor market, it may
yield a ￿ ow of services through the time spent in other in other activities as well. Certain
example seem obvious: some education yields productive services through the time spent
reading books or balancing a checkbook, some improvements in health yield productive
services through time spent in participating in sports, and so forth. If general forms
of human capital yield such services through time spent outside the labor market, these
services should also be considered ￿ return￿on the investment in human capital."
The analysis of Michael [1973] was formalized within the Lancasterian framework, building on the
concept of household production function as developed in Becker￿ s article on the allocation of time
(Becker [1965]). Apart from its standard market return, human capital also raises the productivity of
household production of nonmarket goods. Michael [1973] already writes that ￿one could alternatively
argue that education directly alters the household￿ s utility function", as is assumed in the present
paper. Becker integrates the analysis of Michael [1973] into the second edition of his book on human
capital and notes in the introduction:
6"Although important studies of the e⁄ects of human capital in the market sector can be
expected, I anticipate that the excitement will be generated by studies of its e⁄ects in the
nonmarket sector" (Becker [1993], page 10).
As far as the economic profession is concerned, this anticipation has not yet come true, although
Becker is not the only Nobel Laureate emphasizing the relevance of human capital as a source of
nonmarket return. Amartya Sen [1997], summarizes why he too deems necessary a widening of the
concept of human capital:
"The use of the concept of human capital, which concentrates only on one part of the
picture, is certainly an enriching move, but it needs supplementation. This is because
human beings are not merely means of production, but also the end of the exercise."
..."Given her personal characteristics, social background, economic circumstances, etc., a
person has the ability to do (or be) certain things that she has reason to value. The
reason for valuation can be direct (the functioning involved may directly enrich her life,
such as being well-nourished or being healthy), or indirect (the functioning involved may
contribute to further production, or command a price in the market). ... Consider an
example. If education makes a person more e¢ cient in commodity production, then this is
clearly an enhancement of human capital. This can add to the value of production in the
economy and also to the income if the person who has been educated. But even with the
same level of income, a person may bene￿t from education, in reading, communication,
arguing, in being able to choose in a more informed way, in being taking more seriously
by others, and so on. The bene￿ts of education, thus, exceeds its role as human capital in
commodity production."
Sen [1997, 1999] distinguishes between "human capital" and "human capabilities".3 He uses the
former term to denote the narrow conventional perspective concentrating on human qualities that can
be employed as "capital" in production in the same way as physical capital. And he reserves the latter
term for the broader perspective also including "the ability of human beings to lead lives they have
reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have." In contrast I use term "human
capital" in this broader sense. This is essentially a matter of terminology as also Sen remarks: "The
two perspectives cannot but be related since both are concerned with the actual abilities that they
achieve and acquire" ... and ..."the human capital perspective can ￿in principle ￿be de￿ned very
broadly to cover both types of valuation". Precisely because the same set of achieved and acquired
3While Sen￿ s work is mainly concerned with developing countries, the present paper rather deals with inequality and
missed opportunities in rich countries.
7abilities can raise the level of income and be a direct source of happiness, the present paper summarizes
these abilities in a single state variable "human capital". Sen￿ s "means and ends" receives a simple
non-self-refering interpretation: human capital simply is state variable, that is a means to raise income
but also end in itself.
If Sen￿ s concept of human capabilities has so far had little impact on the economic literature on
human capital, the same can not be said for its general impact. In particular Sen￿ s ideas have had
considerable in￿ uence on the formulation of the Human Development Report, published regularly by
the United Nations Development Programme.
Threshold in individual optimization To my knowledge the possibility of threshold dynamics
in concave individual optimization has so far not been studied in models of human capital accumu-
lation. A striking feature of the present model is that very little is needed to generate the history
dependency of optimal individual behavior (apart from inserting human-capital into the instantaneous
utility function). In particular the path-dependence also arises in a concave setting. The possibility
that path-dependence can occur in concave optimization problems has been largely ignored in much
of the literature which generally relates path-dependence to increasing returns to scale or to coordina-
tion failures. Nevertheless, the fact that history dependent behavior may occur in individual concave
optimization problems satisfying for instance the Arrow-Kurz conditions is known at least since Kurz
[1968]. Wirl and Feichtinger [2005] provide a comprehensive analysis of when multiple steady states
and path-dependence arise due to control-state interactions in concave intertemporal optimization
problems. The optimization problem of the present paper is very similar the one studied in Hartl
et al. [2004], who study an intertemporal optimization problem with path-dependent solutions both
in the concave as well as in non-concave domain of the Hamiltonian. Kurz [1968] (with the state
variable physical capital or wealth in utility), Chen [2007] (with a habit stock or accumulated past
consumption in utility), or the present model (with human capital in utility) are but some examples
￿tting in the framework of Wirl and Feichtinger [2005] or Hartl et al. [2004].
Activating welfare and negative marginal income tax Many countries have recently ad-
opted negative marginal tax rates into their tax-transfer systems, as for instance the United States
(earned income tax credit), the United Kingdom (working tax credit ), Canada (working income tax
bene￿t), Germany (combined wages), Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France or the Netherlands. Some (notably Scandinavian) countries already have a tradition a activ-
ating welfare or "workfare". Surprisingly few theoretical models provide a foundation for the general
sympathy for the concept or activating welfare among both applied economists, politicians and the
general public. In the framework of Mirrlees￿seminal article (Mirrlees [1971]) and most subsequent
8literature on optimal taxation, the marginal income tax rates are always non-negative. An exception
is Diamond [1980], who shows that if, instead of considering the intensive margin of labor choices,
one considers the extensive margin (an individual worker faces the binary choice of working or not),
negative marginal income tax rates can be optimal (see also Saez [2004], ChonØ and Laroque [2005],
Laroque [2005]). Beaudry et al. [2007] deviate from the Mirrlees framework by assuming that the
government is uninformed both about households￿value of time in economic and non-economic activ-
ities and by allowing the government to condition not only on total incomes but also on individual
wage rates. Beaudry et al. show that an optimal tax-transfer includes a negative marginal tax rate
for workers with a wage below a certain cuto⁄ rate.
The literature on optimal taxation typically de￿nes optimality in terms of a utilitarian social
welfare function.4 Justifying a transfer-tax system requires a redistributional argument. In contrast,
in the present paper a tax-transfer system can Pareto-improve the market outcome. The aim of
taxation authorities is to bring about a Pareto-improvement rather then merely redistribute. This
di⁄erence is not as substantial as it might appear however. The market outcome of the present paper
can be Pareto-ine¢ cient only due to external e⁄ects. As has been explained, without such external
e⁄ects, the negative marginal tax would need a redistributional argument here too: Starting from a
polarized equilibrium, optimality with respect to a utilitarian social welfare requires redistribution.
Simple transfers would generate higher social welfare than no transfers, but simple transfers would be
Pareto-improved by contingent transfers involving a negative marginal income tax for much the same
reasons as in the present setting.
The more substantial di⁄erence between the present paper and the literature on optimal taxation
is that there households di⁄er by unobservable but ￿xed characteristics (their types), while here
household only di⁄er in their initial human capital. The initial human capital is but a state variable
that can be changed over time. The possibility to raise an individual household￿ s human capital above
the threshold, to activate him once and for all is at the very heart of the present approach and is
essential aspect of the policy debate as well.
The remaining of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the individual optim-
ization problem. Section 3 establishes the conditions under which optimal individual behavior is
history-dependent. The solution does not depend on the presence of a public good. In the presence
of a public good the uncoordinated market solution will of course be Pareto-ine¢ cient. Section 4
determines the Pareto-optimal solution path in an economy assuming that all households start with
the same level of human capital and constructs a ￿rst best income taxation that implements the op-
4An exception is Mo¢ tt [2006,], who assumes that the government directly cares about the e⁄ort of the poor and
also show that a negative marginal tax rate can be optimal.
9timal solution. Section 5 gives up the assumption that all households are initially endowed with the
same level of human capital and studies the e⁄ect of unconditional transfers. Section 6 shows that a
contingent transfer system can Pareto-improve a ￿scal system that ￿nances the public good but does
not redistribute. The Pareto-improvement requires the activation of the initially poor households and
involves a negative marginal income tax. Section 7 concludes.
2 The individual household problem






subject to _ ht = g(xt
+
;ht) = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h for all t ￿ 0;
ct = wht for all t ￿ 0
given h0 and fGtg1
t=0.
where ct (consumption) and xt (e⁄ort) are control variables and ht is a state variable (human capital,
education, skill, ￿tness, capability or knowledge). The amount Gt of the public good is exogenously
given in the present section and will not a⁄ect the solution. Household income wht depends on the
household￿ s skill and the general (net)productivity level wt. In the absence of credit markets assumed
here, the household simply consumes his current income (ct = wht).5
The interaction between e⁄ort and human capital In this formulation the interaction
between x and h is captured by the term ￿xh in _ ht = g(xt;ht) = (￿x￿￿h)h: E⁄ort is the more e⁄ective,
the more one already knows. In the present framework a necessary condition for the possibility of
history dependent optimal individual behavior is that, over some domain of skill levels, the incentive
to exert e⁄ort rises with rising skill. The assumption that gxh = ￿ > 0 brings us halfway toward this
requirement: The e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort in generating future human capital rises with rising h:
Formally equivalent one could assume that e⁄ort is the less unpleasant, the more one knows:
u(c; e⁄ort
h ;h;G) and _ h = ￿￿e⁄ort ￿￿h2: If we de￿ne x := e⁄ort
h as relative e⁄ort, this leads to the
maximization problem (1).
Also note that the accumulation rule _ h = (￿x￿￿h)h features stronger depreciation than the more
standard form _ h = (￿x ￿ ￿)h. This is assumed to exclude the possibility of unbounded growth.6
5In a companion paper I study the model in model in the presence of a perfect credit market ..... .
6The threshold dynamics also occurs with the more standard accumulation rule. The di⁄erence to the present
formulation would be that the strictly positive attractor of ht in case of a household starting above the threshold would
be unbounded, while it is bounded here.
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becomes easier with rising skill. To complete the necessary condition for history dependence it has to
be made sure, that the rising e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort in generating skill (with rising skill) is not more
than compensated by a decreasing marginal utility of skill. The total (direct and indirect) marginal
utility of h should not decrease too fast with rising h: Formally, this requires that the negative of the
elasticity du
dh(wh;h;x;G) with respect to h is not larger than the elasticity of gx with respect to h. Given
gxh = ￿ > 0, this requirement will follow from the ￿Maslow condition￿ : Maslow￿ s observation that
de￿ciency needs must be met before the household is ready to act upon his growth needs is captured
by the assumption that (1) the marginal utility of consumption tends to in￿nity when consumption
tends to zero (lim￿!1
@u(c￿;x;h￿;G)
@c = 1 for any sequence (c￿;h￿)￿ with c￿ ! 0; independently of
limh￿) and falls fast with increasing consumption (the negative of the elasticity of uc with respect to
c is large: ￿ucc
c
uc ￿ 1), and (2) that the marginal (direct) utility of human capital
@u(c;x;h;G)
@h remains
bounded when human capital tends to zero (lim￿!1
@u(c￿;x;h￿;G)
@h < 1 for any sequence (c￿;h￿)￿ with
h￿ ! 0; independently of limc￿) and does not fall when human capital rises (@2u
@h2 = 0). Furthermore
I assume that lim￿!1
@u(c￿;x￿;h￿;G)
@x = ￿1 for any sequence (c￿;x￿;h￿)￿ with x￿ ! 1 (independent
of limc￿). Thus standard Inada-conditions hold for c ! 0 and x ! 1 but not for h ! 0.
Note that the necessary e⁄ort to raise human capital by an in￿nitesimal unit _ h = (￿x￿￿h)h tends
to in￿nity when h tends to zero. Thus only a very strong incentive will induce a household with low
h to nevertheless raise h: This can only be the high marginal utility of c (the economic motive). The
(bounded) marginal utility of h plays no role for such a household.
The public good The amount Gt cannot be in￿ uenced by the individual household and will in
later sections provide a natural way to incorporate a common interest of all households in the existence
of a greatest possible numbers of skilled households that are able to help ￿nance G. To otherwise keep
the in￿ uence of G as simple as possible I assume that it enters instantaneous utility in an additively
separable way. In the laissez-faire economy I ￿rst consider, the presence of G then has no e⁄ect on
individual behavior or equilibrium.
A simple example that captures all of the above features and that will be assumed in the remainder
of the paper is
u(ct;xt;ht;Gt) = m(c) + bh ￿ v(x) + ￿(G),




; ￿;a ￿ 0 and ￿ > 0. In this example, ￿ measures the intensity
of the economic motive (for exerting e⁄ort), while b measures the intensity of the non-economic
7The intertemporal elasticity of subsitution is one. The consumption part of the Maslow condition thus is just met.
The threshold dynamics also occurs if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one. The lower stationary human
capital level, which is zero here, would be strictly positive instead.
11motive. The assumption about the hierarchy of needs is satis￿ed since limc!0 uc(c;x;h;G) = 1 and
limh!0 uh(c;x;h;G) = b.
3 History-dependent optimal individual behavior
The Hamiltonian of (1) is H(x;h;G;￿) = m(wh)+bh￿v (x)+￿(G)+￿￿(￿x￿￿h)h: Existence of an inner
solution to maxx H(x;h;G;￿) requires Hx = ￿vx + ￿￿h = 0, which is su¢ cient since Hxx = ￿ < 0.
At the maximum vx = ￿￿h. Taking the derivative with respect to time yields vxx _ x = _ ￿￿h + ￿￿_ h =
_ ￿￿h + vx(￿x ￿ ￿h). Inserting the adjoint equation
￿
￿ = ￿￿ ￿ Hh = ￿￿ ￿ mh ￿ b ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿x ￿ 2￿h) into
this expression for vxx _ x and using vx = ￿￿h yields vxx _ x = vx(￿+￿h)￿(mh +b)￿h: Together with the







_ h = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h
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_ h = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h
(3)
The two isoclines are 8
<
:




_ h = 0 if h = 0 or x_ h=0(h) := ￿
￿h
(4)
and with m(c) = ￿lnc 8
<
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The two isoclines always have an intersection at h￿ = 0 de￿ning the trivial stationary state of (3).






























, and D = ￿2
￿ > 0 the (non-zero) stationary states of (3) are the
solutions to
E(h) := Dh2 ￿ Bh ￿ C = 0 (6)







12Case 1 One strictly positive solution h￿ = B+
p
B2+4DC
2D > 0 if C > 0.
Case 2 Two strictly positive solutions hth = B￿
p
B2+4DC
2D > 0 and h￿ = B+
p
B2+4DC
2D > hth if ￿B2
4D <
C < 0 and B > 0.
Case 3 No strictly positive solution.
Case 3a No real solution if C < ￿B2
4D < 0.
Case 3b Two negative solutions if ￿B2
4D < C < 0 and B < 0.
These cases and more generally most arguments in the present paper can best be understood with
the help of the (x;h)-phase diagram (see Figures 1 to 5). The _ h = 0-isocline consists of the vertical
x-axis (h = 0) and the increasing straight line x_ h=0(h) = ￿
￿h. A higher level of activity is needed to
keep constant a higher level of human capital. This _ h = 0-isocline is unchanged throughout the paper.
The position of the _ x = 0-isocline depends on the parameters (changing form case to case) and of the
economic environment (changing from section to section). The two crucial features are the intercept





￿, and the slope at h = 0, d
dh (x_ x=0(0)). In all cases x_ x=0(h) has an
intersection with the _ h = 0-isocline at the trivial steady state solution h￿ = 0. Concerning the strictly
positive steady state solutions, the three above cases arise graphically:





￿ > x_ h=0(0) = 0 as in Figures 1a and 1b then the two isoclines have
exactly one intersection at a strictly positive h, say h￿ > 0: Note that for this case, at least
qualitatively, it is irrelevant whether x_ x=0(h) is increasing (as in Figure 1a) or decreasing (as in
Figure 1b).
This case occurs when C > 0 or equivalently ￿ > a
￿
￿, i.e. whenever the economic motive for
e⁄ort is strong (￿ large), the household is patient (￿ small), it is very easy to raise h (￿ large) or
the simple cost of e⁄ort is low (a small). As a short-cut, I will say in this case that the "economic
motive for e⁄ort is strong".
Case 2 If x_ x=0(0) < x_ h=0(0) and the _ x = 0-isocline is rising su¢ ciently fast compared with the
_ h = 0-isocline as in Figure 2, then there are two strictly positive intersections, hth > 0 and
h￿ > hth. This case requires that the economic motive is not very strong (C < 0 or ￿ < a
￿
￿)






￿ (B > 0).
Note that by the Maslow condition, for small levels of human capital, income, and consumption,
the non-economic motive for e⁄ort is always dominated both by the economic motive as well as
the cost of e⁄ort. Su¢ ciently "Strong non-economic motive" means that the constant marginal
utility of human capital is high such that the non-economic motive rises su¢ ciently fast with





































Case 1a Case 1b
Figure 1: Case 1
Case 3 If x_ x=0(0) < x_ h=0(0) and the _ x = 0-isocline is not rising fast with h as in Figure 3, then there
are no positive intersections.








dhx_ h=0(0) or if b >
￿￿￿
￿2 + ￿￿
￿), then a variation of the (simple) cost
of e⁄ort a can generate all 3 cases. This is again best seen by considering the diagrams: In Figure
1a d
dhx_ x=0(0) > d
dhx_ h=0(0): Starting from Figure 1a, raising a shifts down the function x_ x=0(h), ￿rst
generates Figure 2 and then, further raising a, Figure 3. More precisely, Case 1a occurs if a ￿ ￿￿=￿,




￿2 . Case 3a
occurs if a is larger than this solution. Thus:
Lemma 1 If the economic motive for e⁄ort is not dominated everywhere (for each h) by the non-
economic motive, formally: if b > ￿￿
￿ +
￿￿￿
￿2 (at h = 0, x_ x=0(h) is increasing with a slope higher than
x_ h=0(h)), then a variation of the (simple) cost of e⁄ort, a, from su¢ ciently low to su¢ ciently large,
generates all three cases: Case 1 for small a (see Figure 1a), Case 2 for intermediate a (see Figure
2), Case 3 for large a (see Figure 3). Case 2 never occurs if the non-economic motive for e⁄ort too














2 occurs for no a.
It is obvious from the ￿gure that if at h = 0 the slope of _ x = 0-isocline is smaller than the slope
or the _ h = 0-isocline ( d





or b < ￿￿
￿ +
￿￿￿
￿2 ), then the threshold case (Case 2)
occurs for no level of e⁄ort costs a.
Appendix 8.1 provides a complete characterization of all cases in the (a;b)-plane given the other


















Figure 2: Case 2
Non-stationary solutions
The above considerations deal with the stationary solutions of the dynamic system (3) and to the
household problem (1). Appendix 8.2 shows that if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then in all three cases
and for any initial h0 the household problem has a unique solution fx(ht);htgt￿0, where x(h) is a
continuous policy function. The following three propositions characterize the corresponding optimal
path fhtgt￿0 of the state variable:
Case 1, Strong economic motive, high e¢ ciency of learning, low discounting: Activation.
Proposition 1 If the economic motive is su¢ ciently strong (Case 1), then h￿ is a global attractor.
Formally: If ￿ > a￿=￿, then limt!1 ht = h￿ > 0 for all h0 > 0. See Figure 1.
Proof. Appendix 8.2.
Case 2, Weak economic motive, strong non-economic motive: path-dependence Remem-
ber the Maslow condition: At small h (and hence consumption) both the marginal utility of consump-
tion as well as the marginal disutility of e⁄ort are always very large compared to the marginal utility of
h. Strong economic motive means high marginal utility at small c compared to the disutility of e⁄ort
at small x (￿=a large), while strong non-economic motive means that the constant marginal utility
of human capital is high. The economic motive for e⁄ort alone is not large compared to e⁄ort cost.
The non-economic motive is not dominated everywhere by cost of e⁄ort (it is of course dominated for















g a b -
Figure 3: Case 3
Proposition 2 If the economic motive is not dominant and the non-economic motive is su¢ ciently





￿2 , then limt!1 ht = h￿ = 0 for all h0 < hth and limt!1 ht = h￿ for all
h0 > hth, where x(h) is a continuous policy function. See Figure 2.
Proof. Appendix 8.2.
The initially unskilled (and poor) completely loose their skill and income, while the initially su¢ -
ciently skilled converge to a high level h￿ of human capital and income wh￿.
Case 3, Weak economic and non-economic motives: Deterioration to passivity The eco-
nomic and the non-economic motives together are dominated by the cost of e⁄ort everywhere (even
for large h).
Proposition 3 If both the economic and the non-economic motives are weak, then no household will





￿2 ], then h￿ = 0 is the only non-negative real stationary solution and
limt!1 ht = h￿ = 0 for all h0. See Figure 3.
Proof. Appendix 8.2.
Proposition 4 If the non-economic motive for e⁄ort is not dominated everywhere by the economic
motive (b > ￿￿
￿ +
￿￿￿
￿2 : at h = 0, x_ x=0(h) is increasing with a slope higher than x_ h=0(h)), then a
variation of the simple cost of e⁄ort a from a su¢ ciently low to a su¢ ciently large value generates all
three cases: For small a all households converge to the same strictly positive level of human capital; for
16intermediate a the threshold case prevails; for large a all households choose a path towards increasing
passivity.
History dependent optimal individual behavior is excluded if the non-economic motive for e⁄ort is too













then history dependence occurs for no a.
Proof. Corollary to Lemma 1 and the three previous Propositions.
The necessary conditions for history dependent optimal behavior
The second part of Proposition 4 shows that within the class of felicity and accumulation functions
(u(c;x;h) = m(c) + bh ￿ v(x), m(c) = ￿lnc, and g(x;h) = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h), history dependence only
occurs due to the presence of a su¢ ciently strong direct marginal utility of human capital (large b):




= ￿￿ + b￿h, must be increasing in h:
Concerning the felicity function (with m(c) = ￿lnc), this requires b > 0, the non economic motive
has to be su¢ ciently strong. Concerning skill accumulation, this obviously requires that ￿ = gxh > 0:
The e⁄ectiveness of e⁄ort in raising h has to rise with the skill level.
If we consider the more general class of CIES functions m(c) = ￿ ￿
￿￿1(c)
￿￿1
￿ for if 0 < ￿ 6=







is increasing in h
i⁄ d






















￿ = 1 and b > 0
￿ > 1.
(7)
Thus if the consumption part of the Maslow condition is strengthened by raising the elasticity of mc
from 1
￿ = 1 to 1
￿ > 1, then a su¢ ciently large b > 0 remains necessary for the possibility of history
dependent optimal behavior. In a companion paper, I show that for ￿ < 1 the threshold case occurs
under similar conditions as in the present paper. The essential di⁄erence is that any household will
under all circumstances avoid asymptotic starving (while for ￿ = 1 he does so only for large ￿). This
shifts the smaller saddle-point stable stationary state from h￿ = 0 to a strictly positive value h￿ > 0.
On the other hand we see that by violating the consumption part of Maslow￿ s condition (by assuming
￿ > 1), the direct felicity e⁄ect of human capital is no longer necessary for the possibility of the
threshold case.
In the general case the necessary condition for history dependence the above condition d
dh￿h(mh + b) >






> 0 or equivalently by
"gx;h > ￿"uh;h, (8)
17where "y;z is the elasticity of y with respect to z. If m(c) is of the CIES-class, Conditions (7) and (8)
are identical.
This condition is very intuitive: gx(x;h) ￿ du
dh(wh;h;x) can be interpreted as the incentive to
exert e⁄ort: Raising x raises _ h = g(x;h) which in turn raises future felicity (by both the indir-
ect e⁄ect via income and consumption and the direct e⁄ect). Existence of a threshold requires








Also remember that the interaction between e⁄ort and skill, which in the present formulation
arises through skill accumulation (e⁄ort is the more e⁄ective the more you know), can be shifted to
the felicity function (e⁄ort is the less unpleasant, the more you know) without changing any of the
results.
4 Symmetric optimum and ￿rst best taxation
4.1 The planner￿ s problem in an egalitarian society
The solution of the individual household problem in the previous section does not depend on the path
fGtgt￿0 of the public good provided. Of course this was based on the fact that the amount Gt of the
public good was exogenously given for the individual household. Without any ￿scal system organizing
the funding of the public good, Gt will be zero for all t ￿ 0. The market equilibrium simply consists
of the collection of solutions to the individual household problems of the previous section.
Consider an economy in which all households are equally skilled at t = 0: If they manage to
coordinate the provision of the public good (and assuming equal treatment of identical households),
they agree about the optimal extent of the provision (which, depending on h0, may be null). The
corresponding cooperative household problem has to adjust the non-cooperative problem (1) by adding
the additional control variable Gt (which was exogenous to the non-cooperative individual household)





e￿￿t [m(c) + bh ￿ v(x) + ￿(G)]dt (9)
subject to _ ht = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h for all t ￿ 0;
ct = wht ￿ Gt for all t ￿ 0;
given h0.
Remember that the public good has been introduced to generate a common interest in the education
of the greatest possible number of households. To ￿x attention, I assume that the public good satis￿es
￿growth needs￿(in Maslow￿ s terminology), e.g. enters the utility function in the same way as does h:
18￿(G) = ￿￿G (where ￿ is a positive constant rather than a function).8 Inserting the additional constraint
ct = wht￿Gt, the Hamiltonian becomes H(x;h;G;￿) = m(wh￿G)+bh￿v(x)+￿G+￿￿(￿x￿￿h)h: An
inner solution to maxG H(x;h;G;￿) requires ￿mc+￿ = 0, mc = ￿, or, with m(c) = ￿lnc, ￿
wht￿Gt = ￿,
Gt = wht ￿ ￿






0 if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
wht ￿ ￿
￿ if ht ￿ ￿
w￿.
(10)










h if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
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Planner￿ s solution in Case 2
Unsurprisingly, since G satis￿es "growth needs" rather that "de￿ciency needs", it is optimal not to
provide the public good if the common initial human capital is low. More precisely, the threshold level
of the cooperative solution path is the same as the solution to the non-cooperative solution (xth
opt = xth;
hth
opt = hth). Only when households are su¢ ciently skilled to provide a minimum consumption, the
public good becomes interesting and households prefer to spend a part of their income on the public
good, provided they manage to coordinate its ￿nancing, as I have assumed in the present section: The
positive stationary solution of the cooperative solution is larger then that of the non-cooperative solu-
tion (x￿
opt > x￿;h￿
opt > h￿). This also shows that if households with ht ￿ ￿
w￿ nevertheless accumulate
h, they do it not for its own sake, but rather to be able to ￿nance more of c.
8Alternatively one may consider a public good that satis￿es de￿ciency needs (safety) as does c: ￿(G) = ￿ ￿ lnG.
194.2 Implementing the symmetric ￿rst best
This section shows that the symmetric ￿rst best can be implemented with a personal income tax
T(hi
t;ht), that is, a tax which only depends on the current income whi
t (or equivalently on its human
capital hi
t) of household i and not on its e⁄ort xi
t. To guarantee balanced ￿scal budget, the tax must















subject to _ ht = (￿xt ￿ ￿ht)ht for all t ￿ 0;
ct = wht ￿ T(hi
t;ht) for all t ￿ 0;
given h0, fhtgt=0 and Tt = Gt
Since initially hi
0 = h0 for all i and the tax only depends on hi
t, at individual optimum hi
t = ht remains
satis￿ed such that at intertemporal equilibrium T(hi
t;ht) = T(ht;ht) = Tt must be satis￿ed for all t.
Inserting the budget constraint, the Hamiltonian becomes H(x;h;￿) = m[wh￿T(h;h)]+bh￿v(x)+
￿wh+￿￿(￿x￿￿h)h: The general form of the equations of motion (3) and of the isoclines (4) are again
unchanged. The optimal dynamic system and its isoclines (12) are replicated i⁄ the marginal utility
of consumption mh =
￿(w￿Th(h;h))









h if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
￿w if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
(14)
This is the case for T(h;h) = 0 if ht ￿ ￿
w￿ and Th =
w￿
￿ [￿
￿ ￿ wh + T(h;h)] if ht ￿ ￿
w￿. Solving this





0 if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
wh + It ￿ e
w￿
￿ h if ht ￿ ￿
w￿
(15)
where It is a constant of integration. Note that while It is constant as a function of hi
t, it will not
be constant as a function of time. It is determined by the equilibrium condition T(hi
t;ht) = T(ht;ht)
= Gt = wht ￿ ￿
￿: wht + It ￿ e
w￿
￿ ht = wht ￿ ￿













￿ (h￿h) if ht ￿ ￿
w￿.
(16)
For ht ￿ ￿










> 0 for ￿
w￿ ￿ h < h
= 0 for h = h
< 0 for h > h.
20Thus the tax reduces the incentive to exert e⁄ort for a household below average skill. This tax is not
activating.
Note that the tax T(h;h) = wh+It ￿e
w￿
￿ h induces the Pareto-optimal individual behavior for any






= ￿ln(￿It) + w￿h
and therefore mh = w￿, so that the equation of motion of ￿ is that of the symmetric ￿rst best.
For the individual household, the optimal symmetric path of x;h is implemented independently from
his expectations about present or future ht, since this only a⁄ects Gt which enters utility additively.
Determining It is only relevant for guaranteeing the ￿nancing of the optimal Gt at hi
t = ht.
5 Polarization and simple transfers
5.1 Polarization
Section 4 has assumed that all households start with the same initial human capital at t = 0. In
contrast consider now an economy in which n￿ households start with human capital below the in-
dividual threshold (hi
0 < hth for i 2 [0;n￿]) and n￿ = 1 ￿ n￿ households start above the threshold
(hi
0 > hth for i 2 [n￿;1]). After a while the n￿ households initially above the threshold will cluster in
the neighborhood of the stable attracting steady state h￿ while the others will have lost much of their
initial human capital. This trend towards increased polarization does not depend on whether the ￿rst
best symmetric tax system was in e⁄ect or not, as long as the threshold case (Case 2) holds.
5.2 Simple transfers accentuate polarization
We will see in the next section, that polarization may be Pareto-ine¢ cient. The rich may voluntarily
￿nance a transfer that raises the disposable income of the poor to guarantee their survival and edu-
cation as potential contributors to the funding of the public good. Of course this requires, that the
welfare program does in fact activate the e⁄ort of the poor and raises their education. Unsurprisingly,
a simple unconditioned transfer will not have this e⁄ect. Nevertheless, it seems useful to ￿rst study
the e⁄ects of this simplest type of transfer. The conclusions of the present section do not depend
on the motives of the funding party. As has been discussed in the introduction there may be more
direct reasons for providing transfers. These may be paternalistic or altruistic preferences or simply
the balance of political power that forces the rich to pay the transfer.
What happens if a household with low human capital and correspondingly low income is paid
a monetary transfer Z ensuring a minimal standard of living? For simplicity of exposition assume
that the group eligible to social transfer payments is exempted from any (further) tax. The indi-
vidual household problem (1) is therefore unchanged except that m(Z + wh) replaces m(wh). The










_ h = (￿x ￿ ￿h)h
(17)
with isoclines 8
> > > > <
> > > > :










_ h = 0 if h = 0 or x = ￿
￿h
The essential di⁄erence to the system without the transfer is that x_ x=0(0;Z) = ￿ a
￿ < 0 = x_ h=0(0)
for any Z > 0 independently of how strong the economic and non-economic motives of e⁄ort, while





￿ > 0 for su¢ ciently strong economic motive or su¢ ciently
patient households. As a consequence Case 1 is not possible if Z > 0. This already provides the











































Figure 4: Left: Initially poor and motivated household Right: Same household receiving transfer.
Proposition 5 Any transfer introduces a threshold level hth(Z) > 0, such that a household with initial
skill h0 < hth(Z) gives up struggling and will eventually loose all his skill. The household will have
enough to eat (his life-time utility at t = 0 is raised) but remain uneducated. Unskilled but patient
and motivated households, initially in Case 1 (Figure 4), which would have liberated themselves from
poverty and low skill, are enticed to passivity and will remain unskilled in the presence of monetary
transfers. If without transfer, the household was already in Case 2, then the transfer raises the threshold
ability hth(Z) and raises it the more, the larger the transfer (hth(Z) increasing).
22The transfer thus can prevent economic and personal emancipation towards high skill and income.
Proposition 5 does not depend on the source of the transfers9 or on the motivation of the con-
tributors. Suppose that, starting at a Pareto-ine¢ cient polarized equilibrium, a hypothetical social
planner or a real government wants to implement a Pareto-improving tax-transfer system. Such a
system has to win the approval of the poor and at the same time motivate them to raise their e⁄ort
such as to increase their human capital. If simple transfers were the only available policy, Proposition
5 can be read as a version of the "Samaritan￿ s Dilemma". One can only reduce the likelihood that
some of the uneducated will ￿starve￿by at the same time reducing the likelihood that the poor get
educated and self-sustained.
6 Activating welfare, negative marginal income tax
As we have seen, simple transfers enhance the passivity of the bene￿ciaries rather than raising their
e⁄ort, so that the (non-altruistic) rich have no incentive to ￿nance the transfers. To win the approval
of the contributors the transfer-scheme has to activate. To activate, the transfer has to be conditioned
either on su¢ cient e⁄ort or on the fruits of e⁄ort ￿human capital or income. At the same time,
to win the voluntary participation by the bene￿ciaries, the transfer has to be su¢ ciently attractive
to reward them for the additional e⁄ort. The present section introduces a class of activating and
Pareto-improving tax-transfer systems that satis￿es these conditions.
The initial situation. Consider an economy in the interesting threshold Case 2. The initial
situation at time t = 0 is a polarized society with a fraction n￿ of unskilled households with incomes
below the unstable stationary hth
sym of Section 4.2 (hu
0 < hth
sym) and a fraction n￿ = 1 ￿ n￿ of skilled
households with incomes close to h*
sym. The n￿ unskilled do not participate in the funding of the public
good. The provision of the public good follows the optimal solution of the coordinated household
problem of Section 4.2 restricted to the n￿ initially rich and skilled households. Note that subject
to the constraint that the n￿ initially unskilled receive no transfers, the optimal tax of Section 4.2
remains optimal for su¢ ciently large t, since the maximal potential contributions of the poor tend to
zero in the course of time.
9The model can for instance be closed by introducing a constant marginal labor income tax to balance government
budget. The individual budget constraint becomes c
i
t = Tt +wh
i
t = Tt +(1￿￿)e wh
i
t, where e w is the gross wage per labor













tdi is constant and the
individual household problem is the same as before, where now w = (1 ￿ ￿)e w.
23Proposition 6 Any polarized equilibrium (with optimal funding of the public good in the absence of
transfers) is Pareto-ine¢ cient. There exists a Pareto-improving tax-transfer system which is activating
in the sense that under the program all households cross the threshold level of human capital in ￿nite
time, and converge to the high stationary level h*
sym. Individual taxes and transfers only depend on
current individual income and involve a negative marginal tax for those households below the threshold
level.
I prove this proposition by constructing a corresponding welfare program.
General idea: Activation: Consider Figure 5. To activate, the _ x = 0-isocline has to be shifted
up su¢ ciently such that the initially unskilled choose to overcome the threshold. This will be achieved
by replacing the laissez-faire income yu
t = whu
t of the initially poor for a certain time period t 2 (0;e t)
by the new disposable income ydis(hu
t) = w￿zt (hu
t)
￿. For ￿ > 1, ydis rises faster in h than does wh,
which strengthens the economic motive for e⁄ort. If ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then e h := h
yes




t describes the optimal path conditioned on participation by the poor. The larger ￿, the
smaller the corresponding e t. The time-autonomous term fztgt￿0 will be used to generate a constant
transfer Z at equilibrium.







t] for each t 2 (0;e t). The bene￿t to each contributor is that there
will be a higher Gt for each t > e t. The larger ￿, the larger the transfers but the shorter the period
of transfers and the earlier the bene￿ts. It is shown that for su¢ ciently small Z, the present utility
value of the bene￿ts is larger than the present utility value of the costs if ￿ is chosen su¢ ciently large
to raise the initially poor￿ s rate of human capital accumulation above the discount rate ￿.
Voluntary participation by the bene￿ciary: The ￿su¢ ciently small Z￿(for the rich to participate)
should at the same time be su¢ ciently large for the poor to voluntarily participate. This is always
the case for su¢ ciently small initial levels of human capital hu
0. If initially, hu
0 does not satisfy this
requirement, the beginning of the transfer payment has to be delayed accordingly.
The n￿ bene￿ciaries: For t < e t each of the n￿ initially unskilled households receives a transfer
Z(hu
t) that depends on its income whu
t. For t > e t the household is no longer entitled to the transfer








24The n￿ contributors: Each of the n￿ contributors (with hs
0 ￿ hth
sym) pays the n￿-optimal sym-

























































shown in Appendix 8.4 that this tax scheme is optimal for the n￿ contributor households if they are
constrained to ￿nance the transfers n￿Z(hu
t). The solution to this problem and in particular the values
hth
sym and h*
sym do not depend on n￿ or the transfer if the n￿ contributing households are su¢ ciently
rich initially. Note that at the optimal solution of the unskilled households, the transfers will be
constant Z(hu
t) = Z for t ￿ e t and zero for t > e t.
The transfer is chosen such as to provide a disposable income that depends on ht in a simple
tractable way and allows to raise the household￿ s reward for increased human capital:his human
capital:
ydis
t = wht + Z(ht) = w￿zth
￿
t
where ￿ is a constant and zt is a time-autonomous term not depending on the households behavior.
In other words, the transfer is Z(ht) = ydis
t ￿ wht = w￿zth
￿
t ￿ wht or equivalently, the tax ￿ paid￿by
the household is









The transfer is positive (tax negative) i⁄ w￿zth
￿
t > wht or ht > (￿zt)
1
￿(￿￿1). The marginal tax for a






< 0 i⁄ 1 < ￿￿zth
￿￿1
t or i⁄ h￿(￿￿1) <






￿(￿￿1) the transfer is positive
and marginal tax negative i⁄ ht > (￿zt)
1
￿(￿￿1). Thus if h0 is small ￿z0 has to be large to induce
participation by the bene￿ciary.
Activation The Hamiltonian of the bene￿ciary household is H(x;h;c) = m(ydis
t )+bh￿v(x)+￿(￿x￿
￿h)h; where ydis
t (ht) = w￿zth
￿
t for t ￿ e t and ydis




sym) for t > e t (see Section 4.2). For
t ￿ e t, m(ydis
t ) = ￿ln(w￿zth
￿
t) and thus mh =
￿￿
h does not depend on w￿zt: mh =
￿￿
h replaces mh = ￿
h













￿ for t ￿ e t. For t > e t the household
25follows the equation of motion the socially optimal symmetric solution of Sections 1 and 4.2.10
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Figure 5: Activating welfare.
Each ￿ determines a unique phase-diagram which is relevant only for t ￿ e t. Because instantaneous
utility is concave in x the policy function will be continuous at e t. For t > e t a participating household
follows the well de￿ned saddle path determined by the contributor￿ s household problem known from
the previous section. Thus, given ￿;h0;e t, the (participating) household chooses x0 such that the
corresponding solution path of the transfer regime arrives exactly in period e t at the saddle-path of the
contribution regime. Let e h be the corresponding human capital level (see Figure 5). Raising ￿ shifts up
the _ x-isocline x
yes










in which case the transfer-system is activating for any household starting with initial human capital
h0 < hth
sym. Thus, to make sure that the e h reached at e t is larger than hth
sym, ￿ has to be su¢ ciently
large (see Figure 5).
Choose any e h 2 (hth
sym;h*





of the dynamic system
de￿ned by ￿ and crossing x
sym
_ x=0(ht) at e h. Suppose given some h0 and e t the household has chosen
10Since the n￿ initially unskilled households are identical no transfers have to be ￿nanced anymore. All housholds
contribute to the ￿nancing of the public good now.
26xyes(hj￿;e h) leading to e h. If h0 is reduced and e t kept constant, then the household will of course no
longer choose the path xyes(hj￿;e h) leading to e h. If we want the household to stick to xyes(hj￿;e h) when
reducing h0, we have to simultaneously raise e t. Thus, keeping in mind that the household chooses
e h while e t is given exogenously for him, we can nevertheless express the policy function xyes(hj￿;e h)
given ￿;e h. Let ￿(￿;e h) := infh2]0;e h]
b h(h) be the smallest growth rate of h along this path. Then
e h=h0 ￿ e￿(￿;e h)e t and obviously e t ! 1 when h0 ! 0.
Note that we are considering the threshold Case 2 in which among others C =
￿￿￿￿a
￿ < 0 or
￿a
￿￿ > 1. Thus the necessary condition for activation at small h0 (￿ >
￿a
￿￿) implies that ￿ > 1.
Constant transfer along the solution path The solution of the individual household problem




t gt￿0, does not depend on fw￿ztgt￿0. The time-autonomous term
fztgt￿0 can thus be made a function of h
yes
t without involving any circularity. For instance, fztgt￿0
can be determined such as to avoid increasing cost to the net contributor, when the recipients get
more and more educated. A speci￿c natural benchmark example is to determine zt = z(h
yes
t ) such as










Inserting this zt into Z(ht) = ydis
t ￿ wht = w￿zth
￿














t ) = Z. The net income along the solution path then is ydis
t = wht + Z. The
contributors don￿ t pay more and more when the poor get richer and richer and the poor keep the
bene￿ts of their additional h:
Voluntary participation by the bene￿ciary As has already been remarked, the fact that the
program activates is not su¢ cient to warrant the approval of the bene￿ciary since the activation may









falls in the course of time).11 Note that h
yes
t is the human capital along the optimal solution path
assuming that the household participates.
Let hno
t correspond to the optimal solution path assuming that the household does not participate
(which is the solution to the original household problem of Section 3). The household will voluntarily

























t ) ￿ v(xno
t )]dt:
11If, for any h < e h, the income under welfare were at least as high as without the program (even for a hypothetical
ht < h0), then the welfare program would clearly be as good for the household as no welfare, since even under the
program, it could choose the old e⁄ort path without loosing income (in this case, the household would even continuously
vote for continuation of the program).
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t ) ￿ v(xmax)￿0
for t 2 (0;e t), where xmax := supt2(0;e t) x
yes
t and that ￿ln ￿
￿hno
t ￿ v(xmax) for t ￿ e t. Since h0 > hno
t for
































t ) for all t 2 (0;e t): Since hno
t falls and h
yes





















Voluntary participation by the contributor To guarantee that the welfare-program is Pareto-
improving it remains to show that for su¢ ciently small hu
0 the rich too vote for the welfare scheme if
(19) is satis￿ed.
In addition to the contribution to the public good, each contributing households pays the contri-
bution n￿
n￿Z to the social security fund during the time interval [0;e t]. First of all it has of course to be
made sure that the ￿rich￿are in fact su¢ ciently rich to ￿nance the transfer and in addition coordinate




















n￿ ! 1 for n￿ ! 1, the condition can always be satis￿ed by assuming that their are
only few bene￿ciaries. Instead the condition will be met below by making sure that Z is su¢ ciently
small.







di = n￿ (whu
t ￿ ￿=￿) > n￿
￿
we h ￿ ￿=￿
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we h ￿ ￿=￿
￿
for each initial contributor.































































With ￿ := inft2]0;e t]b ht and thus
e h
h0 ￿ e￿e t a more demanding su¢ cient condition for the welfare













. For h0 ! 0 and
28e h constant,
e h
h0 ! 1 and hence e t ! 1. Note that while v(xmax) depends on ￿ it is bounded for any
given ￿. Furthermore 1￿ ￿
w￿e h > 0, since e h > ￿
w￿. Thus for small h0 (which will always be reached in case
of non-participation), voluntary ￿nancing is guaranteed if ￿ > ￿. In other words, the welfare program
is Pareto-improving if ￿ is su¢ ciently large to ensure ￿ = inft2(0;e t)b ht > ￿ (or b ht > ￿ for ht 2 [h0;e h]),
which is always possible since hth
sym < e h < h*







does not depend on














obviously satis￿ed for small h0. This proves Proposition 6.
Negative marginal tax At the individual solution the household receives a constant transfer such
that its disposable income growth with gross incomes: ydis
t = wh
yes
t + Z for t 2 (0;e t). Nevertheless




























negative if the transfer is positive since ￿ > 1.
7 Concluding remarks and extensions
The pleasure of activity The essential deviation of the present paper from most of the lit-
erature on human capital was the introduction of the state variable human capital as an argument
in the instantaneous utility function. I have argued in the Introduction that most individuals and
households derive direct satisfaction from their knowledge and skill (uh > 0). Now it seems equally
plausible that most people enjoy a certain amount of activity and the e⁄ort that comes with it. The
standard assumption (which the present paper retains) that all e⁄ort is costly (ux < 0) could in fact
be criticized for similar reasons than the standard assumption uh = 0 (which the present paper gives
up). Learning may be as much fun as knowing, jogging as much as being ￿t. To capture this idea, I
allow for positive marginal utility of e⁄ort in a companion paper. In particular, I assume that a task is
pleasant if the e⁄ort it requires from an individual is in balance with the individual￿ s skill, while devi-
ations from this balance reduce utility. The path-dependence of optimal individual behavior which is
generated by the interaction between the state variable human capital and the control variable e⁄ort,
at the centre of the present paper, also arises in this alternative framework.
Perfect capital markets A second assumption of the basic maximization problem (1) and all
its variations in the present paper was that in every period, each household consumes its entire labor
income. In other words, credit markets have been excluded. At ￿rst sight, one may conjecture that
introducing credit markets excludes path-dependent behavior and persistent inequality. In fact, there
is a large literature in which inequality with respect to education, income, and utility only persists due
to capital market imperfections. In this literature, unskilled households with low overall utility only
29remain unskilled because they cannot ￿nance today￿ s education using loans they pay back tomorrow
with their then high skilled labor income. In contrast, in the present framework, human capital can
neither be bought by money (be this a loan, initial wealth, or a transfer) nor has its accumulation
any monetary opportunity costs (_ ht > 0 does not reduce current income wht). The reason why some
households do not raise their human capital here is that it is too hard rather than too expensive.
In reality the accumulation of human capital generally has monetary costs (or opportunity cost) and
at the same requires non-monetary e⁄ort. It is this non-monetary component that generates path-
dependence and does so also if capital markets are perfect.
While introducing perfect capital markets does not eliminate the possibility of thresholds, it adds a
further interesting dimension to the present paper: The interplay between monetary wealth (physical
capital) and human capital. I tackle this issue in a related paper, where I show that, as in the case
without credit market but with transfer, Case 1 is excluded for a household with initial wealth k0 > 0.
The possibility of saving and/or living on initial ￿nancial wealth introduces a threshold level of human
capital hth(k0), below which a path towards passivity is always chosen. Furthermore this threshold
level hth(k0) is the larger, the larger initial ￿nancial wealth.
The speci￿c instantaneous utility function A third assumption was the speci￿c utility func-
tion concerning consumption and human capital. While the relevant feature of this speci￿c example
was that standard Inada conditions hold for and c ! 0 and x ! 1, the marginal (direct) utility
of human is not particularly large at low levels of human capital, the details of the results of course
depend on the speci￿c example. In particular it has been assumed that the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution for c was unity: m(c) = ￿lnc. This was su¢ cient to make sure that the economic motive
could be strong enough to overcome the cost of e⁄ort at low h (this was the case for ￿ large enough).
One may criticize this speci￿cation for also allowing the economic motive to be too weak, that is, for
assuming households that ￿under some circumstances (small ￿) ￿accept asymptotic starving. If one
wants to avoid this possibility one has to assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
smaller than one. If m(c) = ￿lnc is replaced by m(c) = ￿ ￿
￿￿1(c)
￿￿1
￿ for 0 < ￿ < 1, then the household
will be less reluctant to substitute present comfort (low x) with future consumption (low future wh)
and struggles harder when he realizes that this is necessary to avoid starving (c = wh ! 0). In fact,
it can be shown that there no longer is a stationary state at h = 0. However, optimal individual be-
havior remains path-dependent under similar assumptions as those of the present paper. The smaller
saddle-point stable stationary state h￿ is merely shifted from h￿ = 0 to a strictly positive value and
there still are three stationary states then, 0 < h￿ < hth < h￿. The present paper chooses the unity
elasticity of substitution because it is analytically more tractable. Even for the simplest example with
￿ = 1=2, the _ x = 0-isocline x_ x=0(h) is cubic rather than quadratic as in the present paper.
30The common interest A fourth assumption of the present paper was the existence of a public
good and the simple speci￿c form it a⁄ects utility. Sections 3 and 5 were completely independent of
the existence of public goods. The public good has been introduced to generate a common interest
in the education of the greatest possible number of households. Proposition 6 in Section 6 can easily
be adapted to an economy in which the rich have other reasons to voluntarily support the poor (a
dislike for extreme poverty, for low education, for lost opportunities ... ) or an economy in which
the rich are forced to ￿nance transfers to the poor. In all these cases, simple non-contingent transfers
would generally be Pareto-dominated by activating transfers. I have chosen to provide the rich with
an "economic motive" for helping the poor since this is probably least debatable among economist
and since the economic motive will still be there if it is joined by more altruistic motives. Some
less economic minded readers may prefer to put more weight on altruistic motives. In fact, while
most people support modern politics for trying to promote general education, some at the same time
blame politicians for doing so for purely economic reasons, hunting for the human capital￿ s economic
reward rather then valuing the human capital for its own sake, or, as Sen puts it, as an aim in itself.
An altruistic rich household in the present framework would share this view since for the individual
household education is in fact an aim in itself. Fortunately any transfer system that manages to raise
the human capital of the poor beyond the threshold generates the double dividend, irrespective on
how noble the motives behind the transfer.
8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix: Characterization of the three cases
This appendix provides a more complete characterization of the three cases of Section 3. Consider
Figure 8.1 in the (a;b)-plane that allows to classify all cases by a variation of the (direct) cost of
e⁄ort a and the strength b of the non-economic motive, given all other parameters. On the vertical
line de￿ned by a = ￿￿=￿, the term C =
￿￿￿￿a
￿ is zero. For any pair (a;b) left to this C = 0-line
a < ￿￿=￿ or C > 0, such that the term B2 + 4DC is always positive and (6) has two real roots.
Furthermore, since C > 0,
p




2D < 0 < h2 := h￿ = B+
p
B2+4DC
2D (Case 1). For C < 0 the set of pairs (a;b) for which
B2 + 4DC = 0 correspond to the thick curve in Figure 8.1.























￿ and b < ￿￿
￿2￿ + a￿
￿
where b ? ￿￿
￿2￿ + a￿
￿ corresponds to B ? 0. The B = 0-curve is the increasing dashed line in Figure






















the B2 + 4DC = 0-curve, B2 + 4DC > 0 and B > 0 such that (6) has two real roots, which are
both strictly positive since
p
B2 + 4DC < B: 0 < h1 = B￿
p
B2+4DC




2). For any pair (a;b) to the right of the C = 0-line (C < 0) and in between the two branches
of the B2 + 4DC = 0-curve, B2 + 4DC < 0 such that (6) has no real root (Case 3a). For any
pair (a;b) to the right of the C = 0-line (C < 0) below the lower branch of the B2 + 4DC = 0-
curve, B2 + 4DC > 0 and B < 0 such that (6) has two real roots, which are both negative since
p
B2 + 4DC < B: h1 = B￿
p
B2+4DC
2D < h2 = B+
p
B2+4DC
2D < 0 (Case 3b).
Considering the quadratic equation E(h) = Dh2 ￿ B(a)h ￿ C(a) = 0, Case 2 occurs for small but
strictly positive C, if for C(a) = 0 the coe¢ cient of the linear term ￿B(a) is negative, i.e. if B(a) > 0:
At C(a) =
￿￿￿￿a
￿ = 0, thus at a =
￿￿
￿ , the equation E(h) = Dh2 ￿ B(a)h ￿ C(a) = 0 always has a
solution hth(a) = 0 and a second strictly positive solution h￿(a) > 0. Raising a reduces C(a). Since
B(a) remains positive for small variations of a, the solution hth(a) becomes positive and we move to
(the interior of) Case 2. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for Case 2 to hold for some a therefore







￿￿ > 0 or equivalently that b > ￿￿
￿ +
￿￿￿
￿2 . In the phase diagram this







￿ i⁄ b >
￿￿￿
￿2 + ￿￿




determines the upper horizontal line (dotted). If and only if b lies above this line, a variation of a
generates the three cases.
Also consider the lower horizontal line (dashed) in Figure 8.1 which is de￿ned by b = ￿￿
￿. For
any pair (a;b) above this line, x_ x=0(h) is increasing and concave: d








(￿+￿h)2 > 0 i⁄ b > ￿￿
￿: Similarly, for (a;b) below this line, x_ x=0(h) is decreasing and convex.












￿ Slope x_ x=0(0) < 0 i⁄ b < ￿￿
￿ .
Furthermore it is easy to check that the B = 0-curve, the upper horizontal line (dotted) and the
C = 0-line always intersect in the same point (see Figure 8.1). This proves Lemma 1.
8.2 Appendix: The Individual Optimization Problem
Stability of the interior stationary solutions to (3) The associated Jacobian of the sys-






















@ ￿x ￿ 2￿h ￿h
vx￿￿(mh+b)￿￿mhh￿h
vxx (￿ + ￿h) ￿ _ xvxxx
vxx
1





￿ (￿ + ￿h)
1
A and detJ = ￿￿h(￿ + ￿h) ￿
(a+￿x)￿￿b￿
￿ ￿h: At x = ￿
￿h


































h. Thus detJ(hth) > 0 and detJ(h￿) < 0. There-
fore hth is unstable (whenever it exists, thus in Case 2) and h￿ is saddle-point stable (whenever it
exists, thus in Cases 1 and 2).
Stability of the trivial stationary solution to (3) The associated Jacobian of the system (2)
at the steady state with zero ability h￿ = 0 is J(h￿) =
0
@ ￿x ￿ 2￿h ￿h
(a+￿x)￿￿(mh+b)￿￿mhh￿h






























< 0 in Case 2 and 3, where
(h￿;x￿) is thus a saddle point.








) In Case 1 detJ(h￿) > 0 and the trivial steady state (h￿;x￿) is unstable and in Cases 2 and 3
detJ(h￿) < 0 such that the trivial steady state h￿ = 0 is a saddle point.
33The transversality condition The necessary transversality condition for (1) is limt!1 e￿￿t￿tht =
0: Inserting the FOC limt!1 e￿￿t vx
￿hht = limt!1 e￿￿t vx
￿ = limt!1 e￿￿t a+￿x
￿ = limt!1 e￿￿t ￿x
￿ = 0.
Any path satisfying (3) and converging to one of the three possible stationary solutions (including
these stationary solutions) obviously satisfy the transversality condition limt!1 e￿￿t ￿xt
￿ = 0 since in
all these cases fjxtjgt is bounded.
For Arrow-Kurz su¢ ciency theorem (see below), one also needs that limt!1 e￿￿te ￿tht ￿ 0 for all
admissible paths with the co-state variables fe ￿tgt of the proposed solution. This is satis￿ed because
ht ￿ 0 and e ￿t = a+￿e xt
￿e ht
￿ 0 (e xt ￿ ￿a=￿ and e ht ￿ 0).
Any path starting at (h0;x0) above the proposed policy function satisfying (3) violates the trans-












xt + ￿ limt!1 ht = 1 and hence limt!1 e￿￿t ￿xt
￿ = 1: (Note that this
follows so easily only because of the quadratic depreciation, ￿ > 0. Without this assumption we had
to require that ￿ is not too large or that ￿ is su¢ ciently large to guarantee bounded dynastic utility).
Next consider any path starting at (h0;x0) below the proposed policy function satisfying (3). For
such a path (ht;xt) tends to (0;￿1). v(x) takes its minimum at x = ￿a
x such that any reduction of x
below ￿a
x not only reduces h an thus future utility but at the same time directly reduces instantaneous
utility. Clearly this cannot be optimal. Thus the household will never choose x < ￿a
x and any path
starting at (h0;x0) below the proposed policy function is excluded. One can show that this argument
is also re￿ ected in a violation or the transversality condition (To induce the household to keep reducing
x and h the shadow price of h has to tend to ￿1 su¢ ciently fast).
Concavity One way to proof that the proposed solution does in fact solve the maximization problem
(1) is to show that it satis￿es the Arrow-Kurz su¢ cient condition. This condition requires that
e H(h;￿) := maxx H(x;h;￿) be concave w.r.t. h for all ￿ (resulting from the necessary conditions).










+ ￿(G) + ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿h￿a
￿ ￿ ￿h)h, the condition




￿ ￿￿) = ￿ ￿
h2 ￿2￿￿+
(￿￿)2




or, inserting the FOC, i⁄ ￿
h + 2￿ a+￿x
￿ >
(a+￿x)2






We know that x < x_ x=0(1) =
￿b
￿￿ ￿ a
￿ along along each path satisfying the necessary conditions.











parameter a is still free to generate the three cases.




￿2 : Thus Case 2 satis￿es
















￿￿ (a￿ ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿ + a￿
￿
34To simultaneously satisfy these constraints, take any ￿;a;￿;￿. Choose ￿ < a￿=￿. Given ￿;a;￿;￿,￿
choose ￿b < ￿
p




￿b￿￿ (note that either ￿ or b can
take any value).
Wirl and Feichtinger [2005] show that if the unstable stationary solution lies in the concave domain
of the Hamiltonian, then this stationary solution is a node of the dynamic system and the policy
function x(h) is continuous across all three stationary states as drawn in Figure 2.
More general su¢ cient conditions Hartl et al. [2004] show that concavity of the Hamiltonian
at the unstable stationary state is not necessary for the continuity of the policy function. The policy
function x(h) is continuous across all three stationary states as in the concave case if the unstable
stationary state is a node, which is the case if the Eigenvalues of J(hth) are real. Even if the Arrow-Kurz
su¢ cient condition is not satis￿ed, the phase diagram is qualitatively the same as in the completely
concave case. (Su¢ ciency follows from the fact that only the proposed solution path satis￿es all
the necessary conditions (including the transversality conditions, which is not necessary to apply the
su¢ cient condition above) and from the fact that the general conditions for existence of a piecewise
continuous solution are satis￿ed).
It has been shown that the stationary solutions h￿ = 0 and h￿ > 0 (whenever they exists) are
saddle-point stable (detJ(hth) < 0) and that hth (whenever it exists, thus in Case 2) is unstable
(detJ(hth) > 0). The unstable stationary state is a node if the Eigenvalues of J(hth) are real.
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8￿h2￿2 ￿ 4bh￿2 + 4ah￿￿ + 4￿h￿￿ + ￿￿2￿
:




































2￿D. Since C < 0 in Case 2,
p
B2 + 4DC < B, such











Since ￿a ￿ ￿￿ > 0, this inequality is satis￿ed if ￿ is large, ￿ > (￿a ￿ ￿￿)
8￿
￿2. (Remember that




￿2 , such that given ￿, b can always
be chosen su¢ ciently large to satisfy Case 2).
8.3 Appendix: Simple Transfers



















C + B Z
w
￿
h + ￿ a
￿
Z
w = 0 with as
35before C =
￿￿￿￿a






and D = ￿2
￿ > 0. Note that for Z = 0: Q(h;0) = E(h;0) =
￿
￿2
￿ h2 ￿ Bh ￿ C
￿








Higher T , lower x_ x=0-isocline with







Higher T , lower x_ x=0-isocline with
discontinuity at T = 0.(Case 1b)
Lemma 2 If Z > 0, then Q(h) has either no or two strictly positive roots.
Proof. Since the coe¢ cient D = ￿2
￿ of the cubic term is positive limh!1 Q(h) = 1 and
limh!￿1 Q(h) = ￿1. Furthermore Q(0) = ￿ a
￿
Z
w > 0. From limh!￿1 Q(h) = ￿1 and Q(0) > 0
follows that one root must be negative. If Q(h) < 0 for some h > 0, then there must be a second root
in the interval (0;h): Since limh!1 Q(h) = 1 there must be a third root at some h > h.





￿ , then a small positive transfer turns Case 1 into the threshold






then any transfer turns Case 1 into Case 2. The threshold human capital level hth of Case 2 de-
pends positively on the transfer and the strictly positive stable stationary h￿ depends negatively on the
transfer.








￿ = ￿ a
￿ for all Z > 0. At Z = h = 0 the e⁄ect of
raising Z is dominated by the e⁄ect of the constant term, which raises Q(0;Z). Thus starting from
Case 1 (Q(h;0) = 0 has one strictly positive root) Q(h;Z) = 0 has two strictly positive solutions for
small positive Z (Case 2).
limZ!1 Q(h;Z)w
Z = ￿2
￿ h2 ￿ Bh + ￿ a










both roots are positive. The household problem remains in the threshold Case 2 even for very large





￿ then there is no real root. The household problem is in Case 3 for su¢ ciently large
Z.
8.4 Appendix: Constraint ￿rst best and its implementation
There are n￿ poor households and n￿ = 1 ￿ n￿ rich households. The rich coordinate on the optimal
amount of Gt, assuming equal contributions for the rich and no contributions to the poor. In addition,
the rich have to pay a transfer Z to each poor hu
t < e h: Each rich thus contributes Gt
n￿ to the founding of
the public good and 1￿n￿
n￿ Gt to the social security fund. This section determines the optimal amount
of Gt for the n￿ rich under the constraint that each rich household pays 1￿n￿
n￿ Z and also determines
the tax system that implements this constraint optimum.
An inner solution to maxG H(x;h;G;￿) requires ￿mc+￿ = 0, mc = ￿, or, with c = wh￿ 1￿n￿
n￿ Z ￿
1












. This inner solution is only



















































































and thus the dynamic system is exactly the same as in the unconstraint egalitarian optimum, except








w rather then ￿
w￿:
8
> > > <
> > > :
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_ h = 0 if h = 0 or x = ￿
￿h.
(23)






subject to _ ht = (￿xt ￿ ￿ht)ht for all t ￿ 0;
ct = wht ￿ T(hi
t;ht) for all t ￿ 0;




























































The solution is the same as in the unconstraint world. As there the Hamiltonian becomes H(x;h;￿)
= m[wh ￿ T(h;h)] + bh ￿ v(x) + ￿wh + ￿ ￿ (￿x ￿ ￿h)h: The optimal dynamic system and its isoclines
(12) are replicated i⁄ the marginal utility of consumption mh =
￿(w￿Th(h;h))
wh￿T(h;h) replicates that of the

































￿ ￿ wh + T(h;h)
i
. This is the
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￿ or It = ￿￿
￿e￿
w￿




w as before wht+It￿e
w￿
￿ ht = wht￿ ￿























The tax is exactly the same as the one implementing the unconstraint optimum. However part of
the tax is now spent to ￿nance the transfer (1 ￿ n￿)Z and only the rest is used to ￿nance Gt. The
general intuition behind these results is that due to the hierarchy of needs and the linearity of u in
both h and G it is always optimal to ￿rst satiate the basic needs, which is achieved at c = ￿
￿ and
to spend all remaining disposable income on the public good. For this result the composition of the
disposable income (wh or wh ￿ 1￿n￿
n￿ Z) it is irrelevant.




w) the phase diagram does not depend
on Z; the levels of hth
sym and h￿
sym do not depend on Z:
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